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In his seminal publications between the 1930s and 1960s, Frederick Lane offered three
hypotheses regarding the impact of the Voyages of Discovery that have guided debate ever
since. First, pepper and other spice prices did not rise in European markets in the century
before the 1490s, and thus could not have ‘pulled in’ the oceanic explorations by their rising
scarcity. Second, Portuguese circumnavigation of Africa did not lower European spice prices
across the 16
th century, implying that the discovery of the Cape route had no permanent effect
on Euro-Asian market integration. Third, 15
th century Venetian spice markets were already
well integrated with those in Iberia and northern Europe, implying that Portugal could not
have had an intra-European market integrating influence in the 16
th century. Lane developed
these influential hypotheses by relying heavily on nominal spice prices from Venice and the
Levant. This paper revisits Lane’s hypotheses by using instead relative spice prices, that is,
accounting for inflation. It also draws on evidence from Iberia and northern Europe. In
addition, it explores European market integration before and after 1503, the year when da
Gama returned from his financially successful second voyage. Lane’s three hypotheses are
rejected: the impact of the Portuguese was profound on all fronts. We conclude by using a
simple model of monopoly and oligopoly to decompose the sources of the Cape route’s
impact on European markets.
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1. The Issues
The 1490s have always been viewed as a turning point in European history. The
leading names in accounts of the Age of Discovery are, of course, Columbus, who headed
west across the Atlantic to discover the Americas, and da Gama, who headed east around
Africa to discover the Cape route. Both men were looking for better access to Asian spice
supplies. This paper explores the impact of their discoveries on international spice markets.
It was obvious to contemporary observers that the Portuguese explosion on to the
Indian Ocean would have major economic and political consequences for Europe. News of
the successful circumnavigation of Africa was greeted with alarm by Venice: according to
Cairo’s Venetian ambassador it was a  “causa de grande ruina del Stato Veneto,” (cited in
Magalhnes Godinho 1953: 283). Ever since 1503, however, scholars have increasingly
downplayed the impact of the Cape route on the respective roles of Venice and Portugal in
the European spice trade. In the late 20
th century, mainstream historians were arguing that
“(t)he circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope did not strike an immediate death-blow to
the Mediterranean spice trade” (Braudel 1972: 543), but rather that there was a recovery in
the eastern Mediterranean’s share of that trade, particularly after 1550 or so. This was a
major theme of Frederic C. Lane (e.g. Lane 1933, 1940), and it was taken up later by Fernand
Braudel (1972), Niels Steensgaard (1973) and others. By the late 1970s, this position had
become so dominant that C. H. H. Wake (1979: 394) found it necessary to “re-affirm the
reality of Portugal’s dominance of the carrying trade between India and Europe and to re-
assess the economic and political significance of the Cape route in the sixteenth century.”
Lane relied heavily on various sorts of quantity data: Venetian involvement in the
European carrying trade, the robustness of the Levant trade, the size of the Venetian
merchant marine, the stability in the Venetian population, and so on. His focus on quantities2
is understandable. After all, relative market shares were crucial in determining the division of
the profits arising from the spice trade, and profits were at the heart of the debate. Our focus
in this paper is different since we are interested in the impact of the Cape route on European
markets, European consumers, and European welfare. We have argued elsewhere that there is
very little evidence that Euro-Asian commodity markets became more integrated prior to the
19
th century, or that declining inter-continental trade barriers, and thus price gaps, accounted
for the European trade boom over the three centuries after 1492 and 1503 (O’Rourke and
Williamson 2002). However, our evidence on price gaps used previously only dated from the
1580s, long after the initial voyages to the Americas and around the Cape. Our concern in
this paper is not whether the Voyages of Discovery gave rise to a long run and continuous
trend in world market integration over the centuries that followed, but rather whether these
events had an immediate effect on European spice markets.
In order to explore such questions, we need to shift the focus away from quantities
and towards prices, since it is only price behaviour that can provide conclusive evidence
confirming or rejecting international commodity market integration. We are interested in
whether da Gama and his successors brought European and Asian markets closer together. If
they did, then Euro-Asian price gaps for trade goods such as pepper and fine spices should
have declined, resulting (ceteris paribus) in lower relative prices of Asian trade goods in
Europe, and, consequently, higher European consumer welfare. We are also interested in
whether the shift to the Cape route integrated intra-European markets. If it did, then this
should also have increased European welfare, by making its markets more efficient. Once
again, prices should provide the evidence of an increased level of market integration or lack
of it. Thus, we find ourselves in total disagreement with M. N. Pearson (1996: xxvii), who
bemoans the “somewhat sterile debate over prices in the later 15
th century.” On the contrary:1 De Vries (2003: 64) notes the importance of correcting for the general price level in
considering 16
th century spice prices, while Ashtor (1973), when discussing the reasons why
nominal spice prices fell in the Near East during the 15
th century, mentions a general falling
price level as one possible cause. In an interesting contribution, Lybyer (1915: 585)
comments on the fact that nominal pepper prices rose after 1520, remarking that wheat prices
also rose during the period: “The fact is that pepper and other oriental wares rose with the
general rise of prices in the 16th century, almost certainly caused by the addition to the
European stock of gold and silver from the Americas. The evidence of price cannot be said to
indicate disturbance from the Turkish conquest of Egypt; indeed it shows singularly little
from the doubling of the Cape, which might be presumed to have caused a noticeable fall in
prices.” But these remain rare exceptions to our characterization that this literature focuses on
nominal prices alone.
2 Maddison (2002: 52-65) and Phillips (1998: Chapter 12) provide accessible introductions to
these well-known events.
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without good price evidence, many of the most profound questions of cause and effect in this
area can never be satisfactorily answered.
We are not the first to have explored the evolution of spice prices during the 15
th and
16
th centuries. Lane himself did so, particularly in his 1968 article focussing on Venice (Lane
1968), while, in a series of major works, Eliyahu Ashtor presented spice price data for Egypt
and Syria as well as for Venice (Ashtor 1969, 1973, 1976). Our contributions are threefold.
First, we exploit the efforts of previous generations of price historians by exploring price
developments in as wide a range of European cities as possible. Second, we take seriously the
possibility that 16
th century spice prices may have been driven as much by the after-effects of
Columbus as by those of da Gama; that is, we want to correct explicitly for the fact that
prices rose as American silver flowed into Iberia and the rest of Europe (Hamilton 1934;
Fisher 1996).
1 Third, we do not just explore price trends in particular markets, but price
correlations between different markets.
In order to pursue this agenda, we need to take a position regarding when the Cape
route should have started to influence European markets.
2 In 1415, the Portuguese captured
Ceuta, at the entrance to the Mediterranean; they colonized Madeira, 560 km west of3 The African Cape route returned 1500 quintaux (100 kg) per annum in 1501-2, and almost
17,000 quintaux per annum in 1503-6, or 11 times as much (Magalhnes-Godinho 1969: 701).
One estimate has it that da Gama’s second voyage made a 400 percent return on its
investment. Of course, these voyages implied high risks as well as high returns. For example,
“between 1500 and 1634, 28 percent of all ships that set out from Portugal bound for India
were lost at sea” (Friedman 2005: 1213).
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Morocco, during 1419-20. The Azores, almost 1500 km from Portugal, were settled in 1439,
and the Cape Verde Islands in 1460. Further east on the African coast, Sno Tomé and
Principe were settled in 1480. These settlements, and Portugal’s strategic location on the
Atlantic coast near the Mediterranean exit, gave the Portuguese special knowledge of sailing
conditions in the Atlantic and halfway down the African coast. They had been exploiting that
advantage for some time, but the big push took place in the late 15
th century. Diogo Cno
(1482-1484) and Bartolomeu Dias (1487-1488) took preparatory voyages to explore the
feasibility of a passage to India, the latter discovering that by first going west, faster winds
got you east sooner. Meanwhile, Pero da Covilhn went overland to reconnoitre the west coast
of India and the east coast of Africa. Thus, the Portuguese authorities were “well briefed on
trading conditions in India and East Africa and the possibilities of navigation in the Atlantic
before entrusting Vasco da Gama with a passage to India in 1497-1499” (Maddison 2002:
61). Da Gama’s first voyage was not a commercial success, but the knowledge gained helped
push Pedro Cabral off (1500-1501), and his voyage was a bit more successful commercially.
But da Gama’s second voyage (1502-1503) was the first big commercial success, returning
with 1700 tons of spices, a figure that was about equal to Venetian annual imports in the late
15
th century (Maddison 2002: 63).
3 In what follows, we take 1503 as the key transition date. 
What impact did Portuguese discovery of the African Cape route have on European
markets? Based on seminal publications on Venice between his 1933 American Historical
Review and his 1968 Journal of Economic History articles, Frederick Lane offered several
hypotheses that have guided debate on this issue in the half century or more since then. 4 Pepper was the dominate commodity in the spice trade. “In 1496, four galleys arrived in
Venice from Alexandria with 2 million kilograms of spices, of which pepper was 1,363,934
...” (Friedman 2005: 1215), or 68 percent.
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First, Lane argued that pepper
4 and other spice prices did not rise in European markets
in the century before the 1490s:
“The opinion that spice prices rose in Europe in the century before 1492 … is
remarkably persistent … A distinct drop, however, in the price of spices, and
particularly of pepper, between the decades 1420-1430 and 1440-1450 is indicated
[by the data]. Pepper prices fell about 50 percent in that interval and did not return to
its former high level until after 1498.” (Lane 1968: 590) 
This finding for Venice is mirrored by Ashtor’s (1969, 1973, 1976) report that spice prices
fell in the Near East during the 15
th century. This is an important finding, since prices provide
useful evidence in trying to discriminate between two hypotheses which have been advanced
to explain the Voyages of Discovery. In the words of A. H. Lybyer (1915: 577), “one of these
holds in general that the advance of the Ottoman power gradually blocked the ancient trade-
routes and forced a series of attempts to discover new routes ... The other view finds little or
no connexion between the growth of Turkish power and the causes of the great discoveries: a
set of motives quite independent of the rise of the Turks led men like Henry of Portugal and
Christopher Columbus to explore the unknown world.” If Ottoman power blocked the
traditional trade routes, prices should have risen in European relative to Asian markets, but
Lane finds no evidence that this in fact happened.
If Lane’s evidence could be generalized to the rest of Europe (as he suggested it can),
it would mean that there was no pepper price boom to have triggered the Portuguese oceanic
expansion. That is, it could not have been demand and rising scarcity pulling the Portuguese
off on their voyages (perhaps “caused by the Turks having blocked the routes to the east”
Lane 1963: 322), but rather it must have been research and development, accumulated5 In his fascinating account of the genesis of the Voyages of Discovery, Magalhnes-Godinho
(1969: 553-555) notes that while English nominal pepper prices fell during the first half of
the 15
th century before rising again, the price of salt continued to fall through the 1470s,
implying that it was “plus intéressant de trafiquer avec le poivre qu’avec le sel. Mais tout cela
est évidemment trop fragile pour fonder une véritable explication” (p. 555).
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maritime knowledge, improved technology, institutional incentives, and investment by
central authority that, on the supply side, eventually ‘pushed’ the Portuguese explorers
around the Cape and in to the Indian Ocean spice market. As Lybyer comments, if there was
no “marked influence upon prices exerted by the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks,”
then that event cannot have 
“force(d) the western Europeans to seek new routes ... The entire hypothesis seems to
be a legend of recent date, developed out of the catastrophic theory which made the
fall of Constantinople an event of primary importance in the history of mankind. The
great discoveries had their origin in a separate chain of causes, into which the
influence of the Moslems of Spain, North Africa, and the Mameluke empire entered,
but not that of the Ottoman Turks (Lybyer 1915: 583).”
Lane’s first hypothesis is driven by his observations on nominal pepper prices in
Venice. However, Portuguese merchants and state authorities would have adjusted pepper
prices by general price level changes, that is, they would have cared about relative prices.
Furthermore, the Portuguese would have been most concerned about prices in Iberia itself, as
well as in potential re-export markets in north-western Europe.
5 They should have cared a lot
less about prices in Venice or the Levant. 
Second, Lane argued that Portuguese circumnavigation of Africa did not lower
European spice prices across the 16
th century. On the contrary
“… the Portuguese were able to sell for prices higher than those the Venetians had
received in the fifteenth century before Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape. After
coming down to 52, prices rose so that the Portuguese were getting in Antwerp 66
percent more for their pepper in 1527 than in 1509. Portuguese circumnavigation of
Africa did not lower the price of spices for Europeans; its immediate effect was rather
to increase their costs.” (Lane 1968: 597) 7
Lane’s second hypothesis  is supported by scholars such as C. R. Boxer (1991: 59) who states
that prices increased “two- or even three-fold” during the late 16
th century. Like his first
hypothesis, Lane’s second is based on the behaviour of nominal prices, but, once again, it is
relative prices that mattered. So, did the relative price of pepper and other spices rise or fall
across the 16
th century after the Portuguese Cape route captured the spice trade? A lot rides
on the answer. Since we know that the Cape route entailed lower transport costs compared
with the overland routes through the Levant (“the Cape route [was] so decisively superior”
Lane, 1963: 329), the fall in transport costs should, ceteris paribus, have lowered the relative
price of spices in European markets after 1503. If instead it rose, as Lane argued, then there
would be only three potential explanations for that behaviour: Portugal had a more effective
monopoly after 1503 than did Venice before 1497; overseas spice supplies diminished after
1503 for some unrelated reason; or European demand for spices rose after 1503, again for
some unrelated reason. 
Third, although this was not a central focus of his work, Lane also argued that 15
th
century Venetian spice markets were already well integrated with those in the Levant, Iberia,
western Europe and central Europe. Regarding the integration of the spice market between
Venice and the Levant, Lane states that “contemporaries saw a close connection between
prices in the two markets” (Lane 1968: 590). Regarding the integration of the spice market
between Venice and the rest of Europe, Lane states that declining “prices of pepper at
Venice, 1363-1510 … explains the fall in northern and western Europe” which he asserts
occurred during the 15
th century (Lane 1968: 590).
If spice markets were already well integrated within Europe during the 15
th century,
then there would have been little scope for the Portuguese discoveries to further integrate
them. Yet, one might have thought that Lisbon’s advantageous Atlantic location – placing the6 To check the robustness of our results, which use grain price deflators, we also used
available CPI indices for Belgium and England. For these two countries, at least, our central
findings are unaffected when CPI deflators are used, as the appendix shows.
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entrance of spice imports closer to the geographic centre of western and central European
markets – would have served to lower the price spread across European locations, and to
raise price correlations between them. Our competing hypothesis, then, is that Venice was
sufficiently removed from the European core to have had much weaker integration effects on
European markets, and that the quick rise of Lisbon around 1503 served to foster the
integration of European markets for tradeables like pepper, as well as for fine spices, silk,
cotton and other high value and low bulk Asian products not produced in Europe. Certainly
European markets for goods such as pepper seem to have been well-integrated by the late 16
th
century, by which time Braudel claims that “there was a single European pepper market”
(Braudel 1972: 548). However, Braudel’s discussion of this point deals only with 16
th century
evidence, and cannot therefore address the issue of when this single market came into being.
Lane’s third hypothesis and our competing alternative have never been tested with
comprehensive price evidence.
This paper revisits these three hypotheses by using relative rather than nominal prices,
that is, by deflating spice prices by the prices of grains such as wheat, “the outstanding
product of the pre-industrial economies in Europe, and indeed their measure” (Braudel and
Spooner 1966: 392).
6 In addition, while Lane relied mainly on (relatively thin) price evidence
from Venetian markets, this paper will rely instead on extensive 15
th and 16
th century
commodity price information from Italy (Bassano del Grappa, Florence, Venice), Iberia
(Andalusia, Barcelona, Navarre, New Castile, Old Castile, Valencia), western Europe
(England, Belgium, the Netherlands), and central Europe (Austria, Germany, Poland). 7 The reader should be assured that we are not attacking a straw man here. Lane’s position
that pepper prices fell across the 15
th century is held by many. For just two examples, see
Ashtor (1983: 167-9, 313-15, 421-3 and 463) and the very recent survey by Friedman (2005:
1214). 
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we explore trends in pepper prices
before and after 1503, to see whether the Voyages of Discovery had an impact on the relative
price of pepper in European markets. Section 3 provides similar evidence regarding European
markets for fine spices and incense, since there are a priori grounds for wondering whether
what was true for pepper was necessarily true for other Asian imports such as cloves,
cinnamon or ginger. Section 4 asks whether the shift from Venice to Lisbon helped speed the
integration of European commodity markets, by looking at inter-regional price correlations
before and after 1503. Section 5 asks when the Cape route influenced Asian as well as
European markets, and Section 6 concludes.
2. What Happened to Pepper Prices before and after da Gama?
Before da Gama
Relying heavily on evidence from Venice, Lane’s first hypothesis was that pepper
prices fell during the 15
th century, and thus could not have been a force that provoked the
European search for cheaper Asian sources.
7 Figure 1 plots his nominal prices, and, while
very volatile, they clearly underwent a long run fall from the first quarter of the century to the
last. Indeed, they fell from an average of 84.9 to 51.1 ducats per cargo between 1400-1425
and 1475-1500, a 40 percent fall, or -0.07 percent per annum. This decline in nominal pepper
prices in Venice also took place in Egypt and Syria, and Ashtor (1973: 38-43; 1976) explains
the correlation in three ways. First, he documents an increase in the quantities supplied in
Alexandria and Beyrouth. Second, he appeals to some fragmentary evidence suggesting that10
the price of spices in Yemen or even India may have fallen after the First Crusades. Third, he
argues that the spice price decline could have reflected a more general deflationary trend in
the Near East, as evidenced by falling grain prices (Ashtor 1969). Whatever the reason for
falling spice prices in the Near East, it appears that the decline was transmitted to Venetian
markets.
Was this decline transmitted to the rest of Europe as well? Surprisingly, the evidence
in Figure 1 shows that pepper price trends in the rest of Europe failed to conform, at least in
those four regions where pepper prices can be well documented. They rose steeply from mid-
century in Austria (+1.5 percent per annum 1450-9 to 1490-9) and the Netherlands (+1.1
percent per annum 1450-9 to 1490-9), and for the full century for Belgium (+1.2 percent per
annum 1400-9 to 1490-9). They were more stable in England, but still rose there over the full
century (+0.4 percent per annum 1401-10 to 1491-1500). Table 1 (Panel A: nominal pre-
1503) summarizes these trends using regression analysis, where we can now use the more
scattered Cracow evidence. We add a dummy variable for 1410-1414 (not reported in the
table), since there was a very dramatic rise in Alexandrian, Damascan and Venetian pepper
prices during those years, which was transmitted to other countries, and especially England,
where, with a lag, prices remained abnormally high until 1414. With the exception of
Cracow, every other European region outside Venice recorded a positive pepper price trend
in the 15
th century, and even in the case of Cracow, the trend, while negative, was not
statistically significantly different from zero. It appears that one cannot extrapolate from
Venice to the rest of Europe, as Lane did.
Lane cites in support of his thesis some of the same data sources used here (Pribram
for Austria, van der Wee for Belgium and Hamilton for Navarre), as well as Lybyer (1915:
580), who made use of the English data provided by J. E. Thorold Rogers (1866-1902) and of8 Commenting on the Belgian data, Lane notes (1968: 590) that “(t)he decline appears when
the prices in Brabant groats ... are converted into gold equivalents.” We agree that it is
important to measure real (or relative) price trends, but disagree that gold prices provide such
a measure.
9 We thank Ron Findlay for this suggestion.
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Vicomte d’Avenel’s data for France. However, Table 1 shows nominal prices rose in
Navarre, Belgium  and Austria.
8 As for the data in Lybyer, they show decadal English pepper
prices in the 15
th century moving as follows: 12, 32, 16, 13, 9, 13, 14, 14, 17, and 17; while
the 25-year averages for France were as follows: 5, 3, 4.7, and 4. Once one accounts for the
spike which occurred in 1410-14, even these nominal prices seem to trend up over the
century as a whole, and certainly do so after 1450. 
Since the spike in pepper prices during 1410-14 seems to have misled Lane into
thinking that there was a secular downward trend across the 15
th century, it’s important to
identify the causes of this dramatic one-off spike in prices. Was it something unique to
pepper markets? Apparently not, since all spices underwent a similar price spike. Could it
have been some European-wide monetary event? Apparently not, since no such price spike
appears for grain and other products. Could it have been some European-wide demand
shock? Ashtor (1969: 339) thinks so and blames “l’intensification de l’exportation en Italie.”
Yet, it would have taken an extraordinary demand shock to have had such a dramatic
continent-wide effect on prices. In our view, supply disruption between the Indies and the
Middle East is the most plausible candidate, and the central force causing the disruption was
most likely the great Chinese imperial armadas.
9 
Let us start by repeating the price narrative: English pepper prices increased 8 times
between 1410 and 1411, averaged 2.6 times pre-1411 levels until 1414, were still 67 percent
higher during 1415-22, and were still 45 percent higher during 1423-1427. Pepper prices
finally recovered their pre-1411 levels after 1427. With a few twists, a similar narrative12
applies to Belgium and Navarre. Now consider the correlation with Asian events. After all,
this was a period when the new Ming emperor sent a huge armada into Southeast Asia and
the Indian Ocean to extract tribute and to establish his legitimacy (Mote 2003; Rozario 2005).
After Ming military might subdued Vietnam (1403-7), Java (1407), Burma (1409) and took
the Malacca Straights, its leader, Admiral Zheng He, turned his huge armada and army on the
Indian Ocean, invading Sri Lanka (1411) and intimidating the rulers of Calicut on the west
coast of India. Between 1414 and 1422 three more expeditions were sent to the Indian Ocean,
but only one more expedition was sent after 1422, and Zheng He died on it in 1433. Thus,
any impact of Zheng He in deflecting pepper and other spices away from the Middle East and
Europe would have taken place mainly between 1411 and 1422. 
It is only a correlation, of course, but this exogenous Asian supply-side shock seems
to offer the most likely explanation for the pepper price spike in the early 15
th century.
According to Anthony Reid (1993: 12) these Ming voyages gave rise to “an enormous boost
in the demand for Southeast Asian products,” to such an extent that in his view the first Ming
state trading mission of 1405 can be considered to mark the beginning of Southeast Asia’s
“age of commerce.” And it is certainly plausible to assume that a large increase in Chinese
demand would translate into an enormous drop in exports to Europe, given the
overwhelmingly dominant role of the Chinese market in the southeast Asian spice trade, a
question which will be addressed at greater length later in this paper.
  Once this temporary shock is accounted for, it is clear that in most of Europe pepper
prices trended up, not down, over the course of the 15
th century. The sharp contrast between
15
th century Venetian and Arabian pepper price trends, on the one hand, and pepper price
trends elsewhere in Europe, on the other, can have only two explanations. First, inflation
rates may have differed across regions. Second, European commodity markets may have13
been poorly integrated even for “tradable” low bulk and high value luxuries, with the
contrasting trends then being explained by rising intra-European transport costs, or by rising
intra-European monopoly trading profits, or by more dramatic demand growth in the main
European markets, or by all of these. Let us start with the first – different rates of inflation,
while section 4 will deal with the second -- market integration and disintegration.  
Each of our data sources also reports grain prices, a commodity which was
immensely important to late medieval living standards, and would loom large in GDP
accounts if we had them. As already mentioned, Ashtor, Braudel and other historians of the
period regard grain prices as good indicators of the general price level, and thus we deflated
our pepper price series by the available grain price series for each location (details are given
in the Data Appendix). The relative price results are plotted in Figure 2. As can be seen, real
pepper prices trended upwards in Austria and the Netherlands, as well as in England
following the spike in prices in 1410-14. While there was no discernable upward price trend
in Belgium or Navarre, there was no obvious downward trend there either. Table 1 (Panel B:
real pre-1503) revisits the same evidence econometrically, calculating trends for the deflated
or relative price of pepper, and confirming the impression given by Figure 2. The upward
trends for England, Austria and the Netherlands are confirmed, although the coefficient for
the latter is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The trends for Belgium and
Navarre are statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
Sadly, we were unable to locate grain price data for Venice itself during this period,
and so were unable to generate a Venetian real or relative pepper price series. However, even
if we assume that Lane was right in his implicit assumption that what was true of nominal
pepper prices in Venice must have been true of deflated or relative prices, we can safely10 Of course, if Ashtor (1973) were right in his speculation that falling spice prices in the
Near East were due to falling grain prices, then this would imply that real spice prices there
were constant.
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conclude that the evidence does not support any generalization from this Venetian exception
to the European continent as a whole.
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While Lane’s assertion that pepper prices fell everywhere in 15
th century Europe must
be rejected, there is no ubiquitous evidence of rising pepper prices everywhere either. Thus,
the evidence may appear to favour the thesis that Portuguese exploration was driven by
supply side events, not by rising demand, at least over the 15
th century as a whole. Yet, surely
the Portuguese paid more attention to growing markets in northwest Europe, and surely they
paid more attention to the price experience after 1450 than to that for the whole 15
th century?
Figure 2 shows, and regressions (not reported here) confirm, that from 1450 onwards real
pepper prices were rising in all regions for which we have evidence (England, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Austria). It seems reasonable to assume that the Portuguese would not have
had their eyes on Venetian markets, but rather on those northern markets, especially in the
Low Countries and England. Thus, the price evidence suggests that from the mid-century
onward, the incentives facing the Portuguese were in fact increasing as they attempted to
wrest control over the pepper trade away from the Adriatic and towards the Atlantic.
After da Gama
Now consider Lane’s second hypothesis, that the Portuguese discovery and
exploitation of the Cape route did not cause pepper prices to fall in the 16
th century. Figure 3
plots nominal pepper prices across the 16
th century, and they do indeed soar upwards
everywhere in Europe (except, oddly enough, for poorly documented Italy). This visual
impression is confirmed in Table 1 (Panel C: nominal post-1503): only two regions report a15
fall in pepper prices, and these are both in Italy (the Venice series is very short and the
Florence trend is statistically insignificant), while eleven show positive trends, and they are
all highly significant. Lane was right on this score: nominal pepper prices did not fall in 16
th
century Europe after da Gama, rather they rose. But recall that the Age of Discovery also
involved Columbus, and that the subsequent importation of specie from the Americas had
well-known inflationary consequences. Perhaps the rise in nominal pepper prices Lane
observed, looking to the East, was simply a manifestation of European inflation generated by
specie inflow, coming from the West. 
Figure 4 confirms our suspicion about inflation, and thus rejects Lane’s second
hypothesis. The deflated or relative price of pepper fell in Iberia – Andalusia, Old Castile,
New Castile and Valencia; it fell in northwest Europe – Belgium, England and the
Netherlands; it fell in central Europe – Austria and Germany; and it fell in Florence as well.
Panel D of Table 1 confirms this impression econometrically: in every case, we find a
statistically significant downward trend in the real price of pepper. These relative price trends
are consistent with the conventional view that the Portuguese discoveries “opened up” trade
with Asia, lowered transport costs between Europe and Asia, and thus caused the relative
price of Asian goods to fall in 16
th century Europe. They also imply that the Cape route led to
an increase in European consumer welfare and that the Portuguese had to share their gains
with the rest of Europe. Finally, note that real pepper prices did not just fall in the immediate
aftermath of the discovery of the Cape route, but continued to fall during the latter half of the
16
th century. The causes for this will be discussed in the concluding section of this paper.11 Besides, “le poivre vient du Malabar, oj l’action portuguaise se fait sentir dPs 1500 tandis
que le girofle, le macis et la noix muscade viennent des îles de Malaisie, et la prise de
Malacca n’a eu lieu qu’en 1511” (Magalhnes-Godinho 1953: 105).
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3. So Goes Pepper, So Go Fine Spices?
Pearson lists a number of ways in which pepper differed from other spices, such as
cinnamon, cloves, ginger and nutmeg, or what he calls ‘fine’ spices. First, “pepper far
outranked all other spices as a trade item, and a product in everyday use” (Pearson 1996: xx).
Second, “the areas growing the fine spices were extremely localized and hence easier for
Europeans to control, whereas pepper production was more widely dispersed and so more
difficult to oversee” (Pearson 1996: xxi; and see section 5 below). The latter comment
suggests that it would be easier for the Portuguese to monopolize fine spice supplies, and
hence extract larger monopoly rents from European consumers, than would be the case with
pepper. If true, we may have been giving an excessively optimistic account of the impact of
the Cape route on European consumers by focussing on pepper. Third, and on the other hand,
Vitorino Magalhnes-Godinho (1953: 105) pointed out that the rise in nominal prices of fine
spices began after the rise in pepper prices, and he explained this lag by arguing that it was
more difficult for the Portuguese to monopolize the fine spice trade, since fine spices were
easier to smuggle than pepper, having a far higher value-to-weight ratio.
11  If Pearson is right,
the real pepper price trends might overstate the decline in the prices of other fine spices,
while if Magalhnes-Godinho is right, then the opposite would be true. Fourth, Wake (1979:
392-393) offers yet another reason for differentiating between pepper and fine spices: his
figures show European pepper imports rising by just 27 percent during the 16
th century, as
opposed to a 500 percent increase in imports of fine Moluccan spices between 1500 and
1620. Fifth, according to Ashtor (1969: 330) pepper was the trade item of primary interest to17
the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean; they were less interested in the trade in other spices and
Indian merchandise. Sixth, and finally, since pepper was a fairly common and cheap spice, 
and since it was consumed by many people other than the rich, its price elasticity of demand
must have been a lot higher than was the case for the more expensive and luxury spices
consumed by the rich alone. We will revisit this issue in Section 6 below.
Having established the importance of taking account of general price level trends, this
section will focus on real (grain-deflated) spice prices only. Table 2 reports the results, Panel
A dealing with pre-1503 trends, and Panel B dealing with post-1503 trends. The picture for
the 15
th century is mixed. The prices of cardamom and cinnamon rose significantly, with
average per annum cinnamon price increases of 1.5 percent in England and 2.3 percent in
Austria. On the other hand, the price of cloves fell significantly in Belgium and Navarre,
while the price of ginger fell significantly in England and Belgium. We confess that we have
no good explanation for these contrasting trends, but note that ginger is often an exception to
our general findings, and that Thorold Rogers commented more than a century ago on the
unusual price behaviour of this particular spice: “for some reason or other it is not so
markedly affected by ... political events” (Rogers 1866-1902, Volume 4: 662).
However, there is no ambiguity regarding the post-1503 trends: barring the puzzling
exception of cloves in Andalusia, real prices fell significantly in every single case. The post-
1503 pepper price decline was thus accompanied by price falls for spices more generally,
implying even greater welfare gains for European consumers. Indeed, the average price
decline for fine spices (1.3 percent per annum) was a bit higher than that for pepper (0.9
percent per annum), although we would not want to make too much of the difference given
the quality of the data at our disposal. We can safely conclude, however, that pepper was not
an isolated exception, and that the opening of the Cape route was followed by a dramatic18
decline in the cost of Asian spices in Europe, which once again continued for the remainder
of the century.
There is, of course, a competing demand-led explanation for these 16
th century price
declines. That is, could not the secular rise and fall in the relative price of pepper and fine
spices have been driven by faster European income growth in the 15
th compared to the 16
th
century? In an earlier paper, we estimated that Europe’s “surplus income” hardly grew at all
across the 16
th century (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002: 435), while it must have grown
much faster, at least in per capita terms, during the 15
th century in the wake of the Black
Death. So, could this postulated demand growth have accounted for the rise and fall in the
relative price of luxury spices? The answer is no. This otherwise plausible competitor is
rejected when we recall that European spice imports grew very fast in the 16
th century, which
is inconsistent with the hypothesis that falling prices were due to an inward shift in the
demand curve. Thus, we think that the discovery of the Cape route accounts for the historical
facts far better. 
4. European Pepper and Fine Spice Market Integration before and after da Gama
The third hypothesis which we wish to explore is that 15
th century Venetian spice
markets were well integrated with those in the rest of Europe, implying that the Portuguese
discovery could not have helped to integrate the European market for tradeables, since the
Venetians had already done so.  There are two reasons why we think this inference is
inappropriate. First, Venice was tucked away in what was to become the backwater of early
modern Europe, while Lisbon was centrally located on the Atlantic coast, close to the leading
west European economies, and right near the Mediterranean exit. Surely Asian imports
entering 16
th century Lisbon (and, later, Amsterdam) had a more powerful impact on19
integrating European markets for these tradeables than did 15
th century Venice. Second, the
Venetians and the Portuguese organized their re-exports of Asian luxury goods in very
different ways, and these differences must have mattered (Braudel 1985: 125, 149). The
Venetians prevented their own merchants from trading directly in Germany, which meant
that Germans wishing to obtain spices, silk and other luxury goods had to make the journey
to Venice, where they were obliged to stay in the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, and buy and sell
under the supervision of the Venetian government. By contrast, the Portuguese shipped their
goods directly to Antwerp: the first Portuguese spice ship arrived there in 1501, and in 1508
the king founded the Feitoria de Flandres, charged with the trade to the Low Countries. Why
the difference between the policies? In part this was because the Portuguese, unlike the
Venetians, were expending considerable resources to obtain the spices directly in Asia, and
were not able to cope with the additional task of organizing the distribution of spices within
Europe as well. In part it was also simply because the northern and central European market
for pepper and spices was large, and probably the fastest growing one. Under the Portuguese
hegemony, German, Hansa and English merchants could make the relatively easy trip to
Antwerp to exchange copper, silver, woollen cloth or other items for Asian trade goods.
Under the Venetian hegemony, those goods had to cross the Alpine passes before continuing
on their journey south or north. While the Portuguese eventually closed the Feitoria in 1549,
by then the Venetians had begun to regain some of their previous market share, and European
consumers found themselves in a market with more than one major supplier (Braudel, ibid.).
Surely these changes must have enhanced market integration within Europe, and surely the
European consumer gained as a consequence.
Our alternative hypothesis is thus that 16
th century European pepper markets became
far better integrated than those in the 15
th century. We have already seen some hints that this20
alternative hypothesis might fit the facts better when contrasting the behaviour of 15
th century
Venetian and Arabian pepper prices, on the one hand, and pepper prices in the rest of Europe,
on the other. The fact that pepper prices were declining in the chief supplying markets, but
rising in the chief importing markets, hardly suggests a competitive and well-integrated
market. 
We test these competing hypotheses by looking at pair-wise price correlations
between regional markets. Table 3 presents these time series correlations between all regions
for which we have real pepper prices. For the pre-1503 period, the sample includes Austria,
Belgium, England, Navarre, and the Netherlands. For the post-1503 period, the sample loses
Navarre but gains Andalusia, Old Castille, New Castille, Florence, Munich and Vienna. The
table highlights in bold the four regions for which we have overlapping data before and after
1503, where comparison between the two periods is possible. The data offer some prior
reassurance of their quality since regions which were closer together had much tighter price
correlations before 1503 than regions farther apart, evidence consistent with the recent and
impressive work by Wolfgang Keller and Carol Shiue (2004) comparing 18
th and 19
th century
commodity markets in Europe and China. In particular, while contiguous Belgian and Dutch
markets were very tightly correlated with each other (with a correlation coefficient of 0.67),
and while they were both well correlated with nearby English markets (with correlation
coefficients of 0.50 and 0.56), they were poorly correlated with markets in distant Austria
(the correlation coefficient was 0.32 for the Belgium-Austria pair, and just 0.09 for the
Netherlands-Austria pair). Similarly, English markets were much less well correlated with
Austrian and Navarre markets (both correlation coefficients are less than 0.3) than they were
with the Low Countries.12 The Andalusian exception is clearly related to the fact that it is the only price series in
Table 2 displaying a downward trend after 1503.
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The pre-1503 correlations stand in sharp contrast with those of the post-1503 period.
In every case where it is possible to make a bilateral comparison, the correlation coefficient
increased after 1503. Where markets were already very well-integrated, such as between
Belgium and Holland, the increases were small; but in markets which had been more
peripheral in the 15
th century, the increases were quite substantial. Thus, the Belgian-Austrian
correlation coefficient increased from 0.32 to 0.51, the Dutch-Austrian coefficient increased
from 0.09 to 0.63, and the English-Austrian coefficient increased from 0.29 to 0.55. With one
or two exceptions (such as the low figures for Andalusia and New Castile), Panel B of Table
3 suggests relatively well-integrated European pepper markets after da Gama. To this extent,
our alternative hypothesis does better than Lane’s: the evidence is not consistent with his
view that markets were already well-integrated during the 15
th century, and thus that the
Portuguese could not have improved market integration by a lot. On the contrary, European
market integration improved considerably after 1503, suggesting that Lisbon’s (at least
partial) displacement of Venice had much to do with it. True, there may have been other
forces at work that might account for this improved European market integration, but the
Portuguese discoveries certainly seem to be one particularly plausible candidate.
Table 4 carries the analysis further, by presenting similar correlation coefficients for
those fine spices for which data are available both before and after 1503. Panel A gives the
data for cloves, and the results are qualitatively the same as for pepper: correlations between
real clove prices in different regions were much higher after 1503 than before. Thus, the
English-Belgian correlation increased from 0.41 to 0.73; the English-Austrian correlation
increased from minus 0.08 to plus 0.69; and the Belgian-Austrian correlation increased from
0.07 to 0.75. With the puzzling exception of Andalusia (again),
12 all bilateral market pairs22
exhibited a high degree of inter-correlation after the Voyages of Discovery. Similarly, real
cinnamon prices in England were more highly correlated with those in Belgium and Austria
after 1503 than before, although the Austrian-Belgian correlation declined (Panel B, 0.47 to
0.19). Panel C shows that ginger was, for some reason, an exception to the general rule of
increased market integration across these two
 centuries, with English prices becoming much
less correlated with Austrian and Belgian prices; again, the Belgian-Austrian pair was an
exception, this time exhibiting a higher correlation in the later period. We have no
explanation for the puzzling difference between ginger and all other spices, although Wake
(1979: 381) notes that “(g)inger remained the major item in the much reduced Levantine
trade” during the 16
th century, and that as the century progressed, “ginger was gradually
displaced in the Portuguese private trade by a growing volume of the more expensive spices
and associated goods.” To this extent, the declining price correlations for ginger are perhaps
not inconsistent with our argument that it was the Portuguese who served to integrate
European markets for other spices. Be that as it may, the fact remains that for the nine
possible inter-temporal bilateral price correlations reported in Table 4, six show rising price
correlations, while only three show declines, two of which are for ginger.
On balance, therefore, our conclusion is that the Portuguese did not just bring
European and Asian markets closer together, with subsequent benefits to European
consumers. They also brought European markets closer to each other, which implied further
welfare gains for the European economy.
5. The Cape Route, European Markets and Asian Markets
What, if any, were the effects of the Cape route on Asian markets? In a recent survey
article, John Wills (1993) summarizes the voluminous literature that has emerged in recent23
decades on the early modern history of ‘maritime’ Asia. One of the key themes of this
literature is that “(w)here previously even Asian nationalist scholars saw a rapid shift to
European dominance of the seas in the “Vasco da Gama epoch,” and saw the Asians largely
as passive victims, today’s historians see that participants in the maritime history of every
part of Asia included Asian navigators, merchants, pirates, investors, and merchant-princes,
and that these Asian participants remained effective competitors of the Europeans far longer
than earlier scholars had thought” (Wills 1993: 83).
In terms of this paper’s focus, the central point is that European demand only
accounted for a small share of Asian spice production in the late 15
th and early 16
th centuries.
Its share might have risen since Marco Polo’s day, when according to the great explorer a
hundred spice ships docked in Quanzhou for every Italian vessel arriving in Alexandria
(quoted in Reid 1993: 12); but nonetheless it remained small. According to Reid (1993: 19),
over the 15
th century Europe’s share of Malukan spices rose only modestly, from less than a
tenth to roughly a fourth. Pearson’s assessment (1996: xxiii) is that in “the fifteenth century
and later, most Asian spices were consumed by Asians. India consumed twice as many fine
spices as Europe. Of total Asian spice production in 1500, Europe took at most one quarter.
China was a huge consumer of pepper, taking around 75% of total southeast Asian
production.” An earlier estimate by Jan Kieniewicz implied that a similar share of Malabar
pepper went to places other than Europe. According to him, only about 30 percent of Malabar
production in 1515 went to Lisbon (Kieniewicz 1969: 63), the remaining 70 percent absorbed
by Asia – north to the Mughals, east to the rest of the Indian Ocean, and west to the Levant.
He also estimated that only 55 percent of the Malabar production shipped west between 1504
and 1549 actually went to Lisbon, the rest going to the Levant, only a portion of which
moved on to Europe. Furthermore, while European consumption rose during the 16
th century,13 According to Boxer (1991: 59), both European consumption and Asian production roughly
doubled over the second half of the 16
th century.
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so did Asian production: indeed, pepper supplies in Malabar rose by 7 or 8 percent per
annum between 1515 and 1607. Yet, Kieniewicz believed that this supply was driven by a
“growing demand for pepper in India, China, Persia and the countries ruled by the Ottoman
Empire” and that European demand had nothing to do with it (Kieniewicz 1969: 61-62). As a
consequence, European consumption still only accounted for about 25 percent of total Asian
production in 1600 (Pearson 1996: xxviii).
13 A. R. Disney (1978: 36) offered even lower
figures, arguing that the Portuguese only transported about 10 percent of total southwest
Indian pepper production to Lisbon in the early 17
th century, with most of the remainder
being consumed in India. Of course, Malabar wasn’t the only source of pepper: one estimate
has it that in 1515 only 48 percent of Asian pepper production was in Malabar, with another
47 percent in North Sumatra, and the remaining 5 percent in west Java and the Malayan
peninsula (Bulbeck et al. 1998: 62). Southeast Asia found its major source of demand in
China (75 percent: see above). Finally, perhaps the evolution of the role of European demand
in Asian spice markets can be seen best by cloves, since it was only grown in Malaku
(Southeast Asia). European imports accounted for the following percentage share of Malaku
production: 1400-1409 14 percent, 1510-1519 7.2 percent, 1570-1579 17 percent, and 1610-
1619 52 percent (Bulbeck et al. 1998: 54). We conclude that European demand had only a
trivial impact on Asian spice prices until the late 16
th and early 17
th century, a position now
supported by many specialists (Friedman 2005: 1213; Bautier 1971: 142; Spufford 2003:
309-13).  
In theory, the fall in transport costs between Europe and Asia should have led to both
the European price decline which we have documented, and to an Asian price increase. In
theory, that is. In practice, however, the fact that the European market was still relatively14 Chaudhuri’s (1985: 75) summary judgement is that “there was never any question as to the
Portuguese monopoly in the Moluccan spice trade,” owing both to successful local efforts to
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small suggests that Asian pepper and fine spice prices were primarily set in Asia. The Cape
route, Portuguese efforts to monopolize the Euro-Asian trade, and counter-efforts by the
Turks, Venetians and others to break this monopoly, would all have affected the price mark-
up over Asian prices which European consumers would have had to bear. But those events
should not have had any great impact on prices facing Asian consumers and producers.
Indeed, to the extent that Europeans managed to influence Asian prices at all, they are likely
to have done so in the ‘wrong’ direction: that is, if they really did exercise some monopsony
power, they would have driven Asian prices downwards.
Even here, however, the ability of the Europeans to accomplish their goals were
mixed. Portuguese attempts to enforce a monopoly in the Indian Ocean were never really
successful, due to lack of manpower and resources, and other factors such as the need to
maintain good relations with Persia, which was an essential counterweight to the Ottoman
Empire (Boxer 1991: 59; Braudel 1972: 546). East of Malacca, they met with even less
success, having been defeated by Chinese coastguard fleets in 1521 and 1522 (Boxer 1991:
49). In India, they did not buy pepper directly from growers, but from Hindu, Muslim and
Christian middlemen, who themselves were able to extract some of the available profits to be
made from the pepper trade (Disney 1978: 35). Controlling supply was obviously easier than
controlling trade on a vast ocean, at least when the sources of supply were geographically
limited. However, C. R. de Silva shows how, even though the Portuguese declared a royal
monopoly on the clove trade in 1522, and succeeded in dominating the Moluccas by 1533, in
fact their efforts to maintain the monopoly were beset with difficulties, and “when they
relinquished control they had not made any significant impact on either the volume or the
organization of the trade” (de Silva 1988: 258).
14 On the other hand, he also shows that thekeep exporting themselves, and to private Portuguese emulation of this behavior.
15 For an example, see Disney’s (1978: 39) statements about Portuguese attempts to hold
down supply prices in the late 16
th century, “at a time of general inflation.” More systematic
evidence of this sort is what is required, in our view.
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margin between prices realized for cinnamon in Calicut and Goa, on the one hand, and the
prices paid to cinnamon peelers in Ceylon, on the other, rose in the early 17
th century (de
Silva 1989: 37-8). 
To venture any further into such territory would pull us away from the central focus
of this paper, so we will stop here and simply repeat the methodological point of this article:
the true test of whether or nor European traders succeeded in their attempts to extort
monopsony profits from Asian producers and monopoly profits from European consumers
will lie in suitably deflated price data,
15 not in the scattered data on quantities, qualitative
evidence on smuggling, documentation on the spread of production and so on, all of which
characterizes so much of the traditional literature on the topic.
6. Monopoly, Oligopoly, Trading Profits and the European Consumer
The Portuguese discovery of the African Cape route would eventually have historic
geopolitical implications, but its immediate economic impact on Europe has often been
denied. For example, Niels Steensgaard (1973: 154) has written that the establishment of the
Estado da India “led to no structural changes in the Asian trade,” and that “(t)he Portuguese
carracks did not obtain any great significance as a connecting link between Europe and
Asia.” We argue that by focussing on quantity evidence, and on market shares, economic
historians have been looking in the wrong place. While correlation cannot prove causation,
the real or relative price of spices rose in most of  Europe (outside of Venice) prior to 1503,
and fell everywhere in Europe afterwards. Furthermore, price integration between European16 Figure 5 takes the demand curve to be fairly elastic, as we assume it was for pepper. In
contrast, the demand curves for ‘fine’ spices would have been more inelastic, implying that
the mark up from the Asian to European price would have been much bigger for the latter.
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markets seems to have increased significantly between the 15
th and 16
th centuries. It is
certainly true that, as Boxer (1969: 415) puts it, “(n)o reputable historian nowadays maintains
that the Portuguese 16
th- century thalassocracy in the Indian Ocean was always and
everywhere completely effective,” or that Venice never recovered a substantial share of the
market in the late 16
th century. However, this is to miss the more important and systemic
economic point: the Cape route permanently altered the competitive structure of the
European import trade from Asia, and all the more so if Boxer is correct.
Figure 5 makes the argument using standard microeconomic tools. The top figure
shows equilibrium in the European market, assuming that it is supplied by a monopolist. The
figure assumes that the monopolist buys spices in the Asian market at an exogenous price p
*,
which is determined by demand and supply in Asia and is unaffected by European demand.
The fixed marginal cost facing the monopolist is then p
* + t0, where t0 is the initial cost of
transporting a unit of spices from Asia to Europe across the traditional middle-eastern routes.
As usual, the monopolist will maximize profits by equating marginal cost with marginal
revenue (given by the MR schedule, derived, of course, from the European demand curve,
D): the equilibrium is then given by A, with an initial European price p0 and an initial import
quantity Q0.
16
Now let the discovery of the Cape route lower transport costs to t1.  If the route
remains in monopoly hands – for example, if the Portuguese completely displace Venice –
then we move to a new equilibrium B, involving a lower European import price p1, and a
higher European import quantity Q1. European consumers gain in this new equilibrium since
prices are lower, with their consumer surplus rising from DAp0 to DBp1. However,17 Irwin (1991) makes a compelling case as to why this model is the correct one for thinking
about oligopolistic long-distance trade in the early modern period.
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consumers do not appropriate all the benefits of the Cape route under this scenario, since
prices fall (p0 - p1) by less than the decline in transport costs (t0 - t1); thus, the Portuguese also
appropriate some of the benefits, with their profits p1BF(p
*+t1) exceeding the initial Venetian
profits p0AE(p
*+t0). 
What traditional historians have shown, however, is that the Portuguese did not
succeed in their ambitions to monopolize the Asian spice trade, by choking off the supply of
spices reaching the Mediterranean via traditional Levant outlets such as Alexandria and
Beirut. This is what Steensgaard and others have in mind when they speak of the Cape route
not changing the structure of the spice trade in any fundamental sense. However, the lower
panel of Figure 5 shows that the very fact that the Venetians maintained a share of the spice
trade, especially after 1550 or so, served to augment the impact of the Cape route, rather than
diminish it. As we have seen, if the Portuguese had succeeded in monopolizing the trade,
imports would have increased from Q0 to Q1, with a consequent decline in prices, an increase
in European consumer welfare, and an increase in trading profits. This might well have been
the situation, roughly speaking, in the second decade of the 16
th century. But now imagine
that the overland Levant route started to function again, with the same level of transport costs
associated with it as before (t0). There would now be two suppliers in the European market,
not one, and market equilibrium would now be determined by the familiar Cournot oligopoly
model illustrated in Panel B.
17
Since Venetian transport costs are unchanged from their initial level, their reaction
function is given by RFVenice, and intersects the vertical axis (along which Venetian imports
are measured) at Q0. The Portuguese reaction function is given by RFPortugal, and since the
Portuguese can use the cheaper Cape route, it lies further away from the origin than does the29
Venetian one, intersecting the horizontal axis (along which Portuguese imports are measured)
at Q1. In this model, equilibrium is given by C, which involves a higher level of aggregate
imports than either Q0
 or Q1, and thus lower prices and higher levels of consumer welfare (as
indicated in the upper part of the diagram).
Figure 5 allows us to analyse various alternative scenarios with comparative ease. For
example, if the Europeans succeeded in lowering Asian supply prices p
* through the exercise
of monopsony power, this would lead to both reaction functions shifting outward, and to
higher levels of imports and lower prices. The only way that such a development would not
lower European prices would be if, simultaneously, the import trade in Europe were
monopolized, and something like this did indeed happen in the 17
th century when the Dutch
grabbed control of both production and trade in cloves. More relevant in terms of the 16
th
century experience, imagine that the Portuguese succeeded in raising trading costs along the
traditional Red Sea and Persian Gulf routes, without abolishing these altogether. In this case,
the marginal costs facing the Venetians would increase. If they were monopolists, this would
lead to a lower desired level of imports (Panel A), and this in turn implies that their reaction
function in Panel B would shift inwards, leading to a new equilibrium such as G, with lower
levels of total imports, higher prices, lower welfare for European consumers, but higher
trading profits for the Portuguese. If Portugal was able to raise trading costs along the
overland Levant route to a high enough level, a Portuguese monopoly would result, with an
equilibrium at Q1. The diagram makes it clear that Portuguese attempts to block traditional
Levant trade routes would indeed raise European prices, but only relative to a situation of
unfettered competition between the two routes. Successful attempts to block the route would
not, however, have raised prices relative to their 15
th century levels. At worst, they could
raise them to p1, but this is lower than the initial price level p0.30
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Cape route led to falling European spice prices.
It had this effect for two reasons. First, there was an inherent transport efficiency advantage
to using the Cape route, which would only be permanently undermined in the late 19
th
century by the combination of steamships and the Suez Canal. This led to a decline in prices
corresponding to a shift in equilibrium from A to B in Figure 5, which we think occurred
during the first two decades of the 16
th century, when no Malukan spices reached Italy via the
traditional Middle Eastern route (Reid 1993: 14). Second, the Voyages of Discovery
permanently altered the structure of trade between Europe and Asia. While Venice managed
to regain a substantial market share in the late 16
th century, it never succeeded in abolishing
or even suppressing the Cape route, nor could it ever have done so. The result was a more
competitive Euro-Asian trading market, with European consumers the ultimate beneficiaries;
this effect is illustrated by the shift from B to C in Figure 5, and is the reason why in our
view prices continued to fall in the late 16
th century. In the 17
th century, Anglo-Dutch
competition on the Cape route would further drive down pepper prices and drive up European
consumption and welfare (while for products such as cloves, where the Dutch managed to
monopolize supply, prices remained high) (Wake 1979: 391-2). However, these pro-
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Table 1. Time trends, nominal and real pepper prices
Panel A. Pre-1503, nominal pepper prices
Period N Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
England 1401-1503 103 0.0025 0.0010 2.39 0.019
Netherlands 1450-1503 54 0.0136 0.0023 5.99 0.000
Belgium 1385-1503 119 0.0077 0.0008 9.45 0.000
Austria 1444-1503 60 0.0182 0.0016 11.66 0.000
Cracow 1389-1503 41 -0.0021 0.0015 -1.46 0.152
Navarre 1358-1451 64 0.0110 0.0015 7.45 0.000
Venice 1363-1503 141 -0.0048 0.0006 -7.82 0.000
Panel B. Pre-1503, real pepper prices
England 1401-1503 103 0.0030 0.0012 2.54 0.012
Netherlands 1450-1503 54 0.0052 0.0035 1.47 0.148
Belgium 1385-1503 119 0.0003 0.0010 0.27 0.785
Austria 1444-1503 60 0.0117 0.0023 5.08 0.000
Navarre 1358-1451 64 0.0000 0.0015 -0.01 0.988
Panel C. Post-1503, nominal pepper prices
England 1503-1582 80 0.0132 0.0008 15.91 0.000
Netherlands 1503-1600 98 0.0034 0.0007 4.95 0.000
Belgium 1503-1597 95 0.0130 0.0006 21.96 0.000
Munich 1524-1597 74 0.0081 0.0006 12.63 0.000
Vienna 1523-1604 82 0.0065 0.0006 10.21 0.000
Austria 1503-1609 107 0.0060 0.0004 13.97 0.000
Cracow 1503-1600 73 0.0085 0.0006 14.42 0.000
Castile 1518-1620 103 0.0091 0.0005 19.46 0.000
Andalusia 1555-1650 92 0.0090 0.0008 10.92 0.000
New Castile 1551-1620 70 0.0091 0.0013 7.07 0.000
Valencia 1504-1650 147 0.0023 0.0003 6.98 0.000
Florence 1520-1609 90 -0.0007 0.0010 -0.70 0.488
Venice 1503-1509 7 -0.0929 0.0219 -4.24 0.008
Panel D. Post-1503, real pepper prices
England 1503-1582 80 -0.0070 0.0011 -6.30 0.000
Netherlands 1503-1600 98 -0.0153 0.0009 -17.49 0.000
Belgium 1503-1597 95 -0.0097 0.0010 -9.44 0.000
Munich 1524-1597 74 -0.0076 0.0015 -5.09 0.000
Vienna 1523-1589 67 -0.0120 0.0019 -6.44 0.000
Austria 1503-1594 92 -0.0120 0.0016 -7.59 0.000
Castile 1518-1620 103 -0.0052 0.0010 -5.30 0.000
Andalusia 1555-1650 92 -0.0031 0.0018 -1.72 0.088
New Castile 1554-1620 67 -0.0080 0.0023 -3.45 0.001
Valencia 1504-1650 147 -0.0101 0.0005 -20.13 0.000
Florence 1520-1609 90 -0.0114 0.0019 -6.02 0.000
Notes: While it is not reported above, the pre-1503 regressions include a dummy for 1410-
1414. N denotes number of observations in the regression. For all data sources, see the data
appendix.Table 2. Time trends, real prices of fine spices and incense
Panel A: Pre-1503
Period N Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Cardamom
Navarre 1358-1451 48 0.0079 0.0016 5.02 0.000
Cinnamon
England 1431-1503 73 0.0145 0.0024 5.94 0.000
Belgium 1385-1503 119 0.0022 0.0012 1.82 0.072
Austria 1457-1503 47 0.0228 0.0025 9.11 0.000
Navarre 1358-1451 62 0.0071 0.0014 5.19 0.000
Cloves
England 1403-1503 101 0.0015 0.0015 0.98 0.331
Belgium 1386-1503 118 -0.0054 0.0011 -4.72 0.000
Austria 1442-1503 62 0.0005 0.0021 0.25 0.803
Navarre 1358-1451 63 -0.0042 0.0019 -2.17 0.034
Ginger
England 1406-1503 98 -0.0037 0.0015 -2.45 0.016
Belgium 1385-1503 119 -0.0066 0.0011 -5.95 0.000
Austria 1442-1503 62 0.0001 0.0018 0.05 0.960
Navarre 1351-1451 74 0.0017 0.0019 0.90 0.371
Mace
England 1405-1503 99 0.0003 0.0014 0.18 0.859
Panel B: Post-1503
Cinnamon
England 1503-1576 74 -0.0069 0.0021 -3.32 0.001
Belgium 1503-1597 95 -0.0093 0.0017 -5.49 0.000
Munich 1524-1583 60 -0.0153 0.0040 -3.79 0.000
Austria 1503-1594 92 -0.0154 0.0016 -9.37 0.000
Castile 1503-1620 118 -0.0178 0.0010 -17.61 0.000
Andalusia 1554-1650 96 -0.0142 0.0024 -5.92 0.000
New Castile 1554-1619 66 -0.0288 0.0027 -10.54 0.000
Cloves
England 1503-1576 74 -0.0154 0.0021 -7.30 0.000
Belgium 1503-1598 96 -0.0165 0.0011 -14.51 0.000
Munich 1524-1589 66 -0.0084 0.0022 -3.78 0.000
Austria 1503-1594 92 -0.0161 0.0017 -9.30 0.000
Castile 1503-1620 118 -0.0112 0.0012 -9.51 0.000
Andalusia 1569-1650 80 0.0048 0.0023 2.05 0.044
Ginger
England 1503-1576 74 -0.0032 0.0022 -1.42 0.159
Belgium 1503-1600 98 -0.0234 0.0018 -13.12 0.000
Munich 1524-1590 67 -0.0160 0.0023 -7.08 0.000
Austria 1503-1594 92 -0.0116 0.0019 -6.12 0.000
Incense
Castile 1510-1620 111 -0.0055 0.0010 -5.32 0.000
New Castile 1554-1620 67 -0.0171 0.0019 -9.23 0.000
Mace
England 1503-1576 74 -0.0076 0.0017 -4.43 0.000
Notes: N denotes number of observations in the regression. The pre-1503 regressions include
a dummy for 1410-14. For all data sources, see the data appendix.38
Table 3. Correlations in real pepper prices before and after 1503
(pairwise samples)
Panel A. Pre-1503
England Netherlands Belgium Austria Navarre
England 1.0000 0.4976 0.5583 0.2940 0.2929
Netherlands 0.4976 1.0000 0.6717 0.0885 N/A
Belgium 0.5583 0.6717 1.0000 0.3230 0.3972
Austria 0.2940 0.0885 0.3230 1.0000 N/A
Navarre 0.2929 N/A 0.3972 N/A 1.0000
Panel B. Post-1503
England Netherlands Belgium Austria Vienna Munich Castile Andalusia New Castile
England 1.0000 0.5876 0.6519 0.5464 0.4421 0.4014 0.3533 0.6987 0.1429
Netherlands 0.5876 1.0000 0.6744 0.6265 0.5958 0.5489 0.5459 0.3670 0.2175
Belgium 0.6519 0.6744 1.0000 0.5062 0.5326 0.3911 0.4440 0.1681 0.0712
Austria 0.5464 0.6265 0.5062 1.0000 0.6395 0.4700 0.3716 -0.6630 -0.3758
Vienna 0.4421 0.5958 0.5326 0.6395 1.0000 0.7808 0.3239 -0.0304 0.4657
Munich 0.4014 0.5489 0.3911 0.4700 0.7808 1.0000 0.4000 0.0181 0.3095
Castile 0.3533 0.5459 0.4440 0.3716 0.3239 0.4000 1.0000 0.3406 0.6058
Andalusia 0.6987 0.3670 0.1681 -0.6630 -0.0304 0.0181 0.3406 1.0000 0.4187
New Castile 0.1429 0.2175 0.0712 -0.3758 0.4657 0.3095 0.6058 0.4187 1.0000
Valencia 0.4017 0.7871 0.5875 0.4270 0.6560 0.6160 0.5973 0.3858 0.5875
Florence 0.3939 0.3704 0.3904 0.3493 0.4494 0.5104 0.5057 0.2552 0.2496
Note: see text and data appendix.39




England Belgium Austria Navarre
England 1.0000 0.4105 -0.0799 0.4828
Belgium 0.4105 1.0000 0.0698 0.5925
Austria -0.0799 0.0698 1.0000 -0.7663
Navarre 0.4828 0.5925 -0.7663 1.0000
Post-1503
England Belgium Austria Munich Castile Andalusia
England 1.0000 0.7321 0.6915 0.5361 0.4831 -0.5517
Belgium 0.7321 1.0000 0.7502 0.4385 0.6354 -0.1609
Austria 0.6915 0.7502 1.0000 0.6361 0.5461 -0.5785
Munich 0.5361 0.4385 0.6361 1.0000 0.3650 -0.2592
Castile 0.4831 0.6354 0.5461 0.3650 1.0000 0.0727
Andalusia -0.5517 -0.1609 -0.5785 -0.2592 0.0727 1.0000
Panel B: Cinnamon
Pre-1503
England Belgium Austria Navarre
England 1.0000 0.3141 -0.1145 0.0880
Belgium 0.3141 1.0000 0.4711 0.3355
Austria -0.1145 0.4711 1.0000 N\A
Navarre 0.0880 0.3355 N\A 1.0000
Post-1503
England Belgium Austria Munich Castile Andalusia New Castile
England 1.0000 0.4817 0.4414 0.3609 0.1317 0.5801 0.3515
Belgium 0.4817 1.0000 0.1905 0.7251 0.4823 0.7779 0.7733
Austria 0.4414 0.1905 1.0000 0.1284 0.4787 -0.5313 -0.3526
Munich 0.3609 0.7251 0.1284 1.0000 0.7287 0.7782 0.8456
Castile 0.1317 0.4823 0.4787 0.7287 1.0000 0.9184 0.9453
Andalusia 0.5801 0.7779 -0.5313 0.7782 0.9184 1.0000 0.9057
New Castile 0.3515 0.7733 -0.3526 0.8456 0.9453 0.9057 1.0000
C. Ginger
Pre-1503
England Belgium Austria Navarre
England 1.0000 0.2375 0.5978 0.4443
Belgium 0.2375 1.0000 0.2426 0.6089
Austria 0.5978 0.2426 1.0000 0.9825
Navarre 0.4443 0.6089 0.9825 1.0000
Post-1503
England Belgium Austria Munich
England 1.0000 0.0170 0.0396 0.6871
Belgium 0.0170 1.0000 0.5326 0.7564
Austria 0.0396 0.5326 1.0000 0.2190
Munich 0.6871 0.7564 0.2190 1.0000
Note: see text and data appendix.40
Data Appendix
All price series used in this paper are denominated in different units and currencies (e.g,
ducats per cargo or pence per pound). Thus, the analysis only explores time series within
countries, where such measurement issues are irrelevant. When computing relative price
trends within countries, however, we have made sure that the nominal prices being compared
were expressed in the same currency.
For a good survey of the data sources, Arthur H. Cole and Ruth Crandall, “The International
Scientific Committee on Price History,” Journal of Economic History 24, 3 (September
1964): 381-8 is still very useful. See also Fernand P. Braudel and Frank Spooner, ‘Prices in
Europe from 1450 to 1750,” Chapter VII, in E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson (eds.), The
Cambridge Economic History of Europe: Volume IV: The Economy of Expanding Europe in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967):
374-486.
Regional Price Data Sources:
Italy 
Venice 1363-1510 pepper prices from Frederic C. Lane, “Pepper Prices Before Da Gama,”
Journal of Economic History 28, 4 (December 1968): 590-7.  
Bassano del Grappa 1501-1610 grain prices from Gabriele Lombardini, Pane e denaro a
Bassano; prezzi del grano e politica dell’approvvigionamento dei cereali tra il 1501 e il
1799 (Venice: N. Pozza, 1963). Bassano del Grappa is an Italian town 60 km. (37 mi.) inland
from Venice.
Florence 1520-1610 pepper and grain prices from Giuseppe Parenti, Prime ricerche sulla
rivoluzione dei prezzi in Firenze (Florence: C. Cya, 1939). 
Spain 
All of the following but Barcelona and Navarre are from Earl J. Hamilton, American
Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1934):  
Andalusia 1554-1650 wheat and spice prices, 1555-1650 pepper prices. 
New Castile 1554-1620 wheat prices, 1551-1620 pepper and spice prices.  
Old Castile 1503-1650 wheat prices, 1502-1620 spice prices, 1518-1620 pepper prices. 
Valencia 1501-1650 wheat prices, 1504-1650 pepper and spice prices.  
Barcelona 1463-1806 wheat prices, 1501-1808 barley prices, 1501-1800 spice prices, 1512-
1802 pepper prices from Gaspar Feliu I Montfort, Precios y Salaries en la Cataluna
Moderna: Volume I (Madrid: Banco de Espana, 1991).
Navarre 1351-1451 agricultural goods prices, 1358-1451 pepper prices, 1357-1451 spice
prices from Earl J. Hamilton, Money, Prices and Wages in Valencia, Aragon, and Navarre,
1351-1500 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936).  41
Holland 
1450-1800 rye, rye bread and pepper prices from Jan Luiten van Zanden, “What Happened
to the Standard of Living before the Industrial Revolution? New Evidence from the Western
Part of the Netherlands,” in Robert Allen, Tommy Bengtson, and Martin Dribe (eds.), The
Standard of Living before the Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005
forthcoming). Most of these price data were, in turn, taken from N. W. Posthumus, Inquiry
into the History of Prices in Holland (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1943/64) and a database of prices
paid by the cloister of Leeuwenhorst between 1410 and 1570. 
Belgium 
1366-1600 rye, barley oats and grain prices, 1385-1597 pepper prices, 1385-1600 spice
prices from Herman van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European
Economy (fourteenth-sixteenth centuries): I. Statistics (Louvain: 1963).
Austria 
Vienna 1443-1594 wheat, barley, oats and grain prices, 1371-1609 pepper prices, 1442-
1609 spice prices from Alfred Francis Pribram, Materialien zur Geschichte der Preise und
Löhne in Österreich (Wien: Carl Ueberreuters Verlag, 1938). These data are from the records
of Stift Klosterneuburg, which is roughly 15 miles outside of Vienna.
Germany 
Munich 1450-1599 wheat, rye, barley, oats and grain prices, 1524-1599 pepper and spice
prices from M. J. Elsas, Umriss Einer Geschichte der Preise und Lohne in Deutschland
(Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1936).
England 
1401-1582 wheat, barley, oats, rye, and pepper prices, 1403-1582 spice prices from J. E.
Thorold Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England : From the Year after the
Oxford Parliament (1259) to the Commencement of the Continental War (1793): Vol. IV
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1866-1902).
1200-1860 pepper prices from personal correspondence with Gregory Clark (2005).
1205-1865 grain prices from Gregory Clark, “The Condition of the Working-Class in
England, 1200-2000: Magna Carta to Tony Blair,” unpublished, Department of Economics,
University of California Davis (2004): Table 4, pp. 39-40. 
France 
1450-1600 grain prices from personal correspondence with Jan Luiten van Zanden  (2005).
Deflating by consumer price indices:
We have consumer price indices for two countries, England and Belgium. In both cases the
data were graciously provided by John Munro. For details on the methods used to calculate42
these CPI see, for example, his “Builders’ Wages in Southern England and the Southern Low
Countries, 1346 -1500: A Comparative Study of Trends in and Levels of Real Incomes,” in
Simonetta Caviococchi, ed., L’Edilizia prima della rivoluzione industriale, secc. XIII-XVIII,
Atti delle “Settimana di Studi” e altri convegni, no. 36, Istituto Internazionale di Storia
Economica “Francesco Datini” (Florence, 2005), pp. 1013-76.
As can be seen in Appendix Figure 1, it makes no difference to our main results if we deflate
pepper prices by the CPI, rather than by grain prices alone. The figure shows that CPI-
deflated pepper prices experienced a sharp spike in the second decade of the 15
th century, but
that abstracting from this, the deflated pepper price tended to trend upward during the 15
th
century, before trending downward during the 16
th century. Thus, we feel confident that our
grain-deflated results reported in the text do indeed reflect movements in real pepper prices.43
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Figure 1. Nominal pepper prices, pre-1503
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Figure 2. Real pepper prices, pre-1503
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Figure 3. Nominal pepper prices, post-1503
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Figure 4. Real pepper prices, post-1503



























Figure 5. Monopoly, oligopoly and declining transport costs 